Buyer Size and Bargaining Power
AbstractThe paper examines the conventional wisdom that large buyers pay lower prices to suppliers than do small buyers. In the model, a supplier separately bargains with n buyers. The buyer's size is endogenous since they can merge prior to negotiations with the supplier.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0424.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- David Mills, 2007. "Quasi-Partnerships in Distribution," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 155-168, November.
- David Mills, 2010. "Buyer Power and Industry Structure," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 213-225, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fumiko Matsumoto).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.