The Economics of Railroad “Captive Shipper” Legislation
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Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: Director of Economic Research, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, and Visiting Professor, New Economic School, Moscow. The author thanks Ken Heyer, Donna Kooperstein, Henry Posner III, Oliver Richard, Carl Shapiro, and Lou Thompson for comments on an earlier draft. The Antitrust Division encourages independent research by its economists. The views expressed herein are entirely those of the author and are not purported to reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice.
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Cited by:
- McCullough, Gerard J., 2015. "Constrained Market Pricing and Revenue Adequacy: Regulatory Implications for Shippers and Class I U.S. Freight Railroads," Staff Papers 207766, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
- Ndembe, Elvis & Bitzan, John D., 2022. "A shadow price approach examining service quality in a heavily captive U.S. freight transportation market: The case of grain transport," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 1-10.
- T. Randolph Beard & Jeffrey Thomas Macher & Chris Vickers, 2016. "This Time is Different (?): Telecommunications Unbundling and Lessons for Railroad Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 289-310, September.
More about this item
Keywords
freight railroads; captive shippers; antitrust; regulation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IND-2010-05-22 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2010-05-22 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-05-22 (Regulation)
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