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Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program

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  • Nejat Anbarci

    ()

  • Ching-jen Sun

    ()

Abstract

This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash’s crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance in its series Economics Series with number 2012_9.

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Date of creation: 17 Nov 2012
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Handle: RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2012_9

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Keywords: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions; Nash program; axiomatic characterization; noncooperative foundations; economics of search.;

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  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
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  4. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
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  7. Tai-wei Hu & John Kennan & Neil Wallace, 2009. "Coalition-Proof Trade and the Friedman Rule in the Lagos-Wright Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(1), pages 116-137, 02.
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  9. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627 Elsevier.
  10. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  11. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2004. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 346, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  12. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-86, September.
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  15. Guillaume Rocheteau & Randall Wright, 2004. "Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equilibrium, and in competitive search equilibrium," Working Paper 0405, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  16. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
  17. Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-41, February.
  18. Klaus Kultti & Hannu Vartiainen, 2010. "Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 677-689, October.
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  21. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2008. "Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  22. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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