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Weakest Collective Rationality and the Nash Bargaining Solution

Author

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  • Nejat Anbarci
  • Ching-jen Sun

Abstract

We propose a new axiom, Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) in Nash (1950)’s original characterization and Strong Individual Rationality (SIR) in Roth (1977)’s characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by Symmetry (SYM), Scale Invariance (SI), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and our Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) axiom.

Suggested Citation

  • Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2009. "Weakest Collective Rationality and the Nash Bargaining Solution," Working Papers 2009_16, Deakin University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2009_16
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    File URL: http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/aef/workingpapers/papers/2009_16.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash Bargaining Solution; Pareto Optimality; Strong Individual Rationality; Weak Pareto Optimality; Weakest Collective Rationality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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