We propose a new axiom, Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) in Nash (1950)’s original characterization and Strong Individual Rationality (SIR) in Roth (1977)’s characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by Symmetry (SYM), Scale Invariance (SI), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and our Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) axiom.
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Paper provided by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance in its series Economics Series with number
2009_16.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances