In the situation where agents have private information we introduce several notions of Core depending on the information a coalition may have when it forms. The stability of Coremechanisms to secession proposals is investigated. The two different kinds of stability analysis under consideration, normative and strategic, tend to give support to the more natural extension of the Core, called Statistical Core,only in situations where some strong form of increasing returns to distribution is met. Without this property, arguments for a concept of Core that is non vacuous in a reasonably large class of problems are less compelling. Applications to taxation and insurance are given.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.