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Selection Filters, Redistributive Taxation and Overconfidence

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Author Info
Kai A. Konrad
Amedeo Spadaro

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Abstract

Education can be a filter that solves an assignment problem. We consider what this implies for redistributive taxation in the political process. First we assume that all individuals have undistorted expectations about their abilities. Then we analyse populations in which some group of workers is overly confident. The overconfident are more successful, but enjoy lower utility. Just confident workers benefit from overly confident workers. Also, the preferences of just confident workers for redistribution do not necessarily exceed those of overconfident workers.

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Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 2003-22.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:2003-22

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  1. Glazer Amihai & Konrad Kai A., 1994. "Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 278-291, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Hamada, Koichi, 1974. "Income taxation and educational subsidy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 145-158, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Flam, S.D. & Risa, A.E., 2001. "Ability, Self-confidence and Search," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1601, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
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  4. Sjögren, Anna & Sällström, Susanna, 2004. "Trapped, Delayed and Handicapped," Working Paper Series 613, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Fisher, Walter H. & Keuschnigg, Christian, 2000. "Public Policy for Efficient Education," Economics Series 90, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1996. "Social Insurance, Incentives and Risk Taking," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
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  7. Roland Bénabou & Efe A. Ok, 2001. "Social Mobility And The Demand For Redistribution: The Poum Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 447-487, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973. "Higher education as a filter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 193-216, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Riley, John G, 1979. "Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages S227-52, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Andersson, Fredrik, 1996. "Income taxation and job-market signaling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 277-298, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Agell, Jonas & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1992. "Union Egalitarianism as Income Insurance," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(235), pages 295-310, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 503-519, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 171-89, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Aviad Heifetz & Yossef Spiegel, 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1649, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  15. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence," Discussion Papers 1274, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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