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Stochastic fertility, moral hazard, and the design of pay-as-you-go pension plans

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  • Helmuth Cremer
  • Firouz Gahvari
  • Pierre Pestieau

Abstract

This paper models a two-period overlapping generations economy in the steady state where the realization of the quantity/quality number of children depends on an initial investment in children and on a random shock. It shows that the implementation of the first-best allocation, in which the effort level is publicly observable, requires a subsidy on the investment in children. There should also be full insurance with respect to second-period consumption and pensions must be invariant to the number of children. On the other hand, when investment is unobservable and one cannot subsidize it, the full insurance property goes away. In this case, pensions must be linked positively to the number of children.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 2003-21.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:2003-21

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References

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  1. G. ABIO & Géraldine MAHIEU & C. Patxot, 2002. "On the Optimality of PAYG Pension Systems in an Endogenous Fertility Setting," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002006, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  2. van Groezen, Bas & Leers, Theo & Meijdam, Lex, 2003. "Social security and endogenous fertility: pensions and child allowances as siamese twins," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 233-251, February.
  3. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Munich Reprints in Economics 938, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Martin Kolmar, 1997. "Intergenerational redistribution in a small open economy with endogenous fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 335-356.
  5. Robert Fenge & Volker Meier, 2003. "Pensions and Fertility Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 879, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa & Pettini, Anna, 2003. "Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1165-1177, May.
  7. Bental, Benjamin, 1989. "The Old Age Security Hypothesis and Optimal Population Growth," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 285-301.
  8. Groezen, B.J.A.M. van & Leers, T. & Meijdam, A.C., 2000. "Family Size, Looming Demographic Changes and the Efficiency of Social Security Reform," Discussion Paper 2000-27, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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Cited by:
  1. Martin Werding, 2006. "Kinderrente und Vorsorgepflicht - der ifo-Vorschlag zur Lösung der demographischen Krise des Rentensystems," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 59(07), pages 44-53, 04.
  2. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Pestieau, Pierre, 2011. "Fertility, human capital accumulation, and the pension system," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1272-1279.
  3. CREMER, Helmuth & GAHVARI, Firouz & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2006. "Pensions with heterogenous individuals and endogenous fertility," CORE Discussion Papers 2006015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Galasso, Vincenzo & Gatti, Roberta & Profeta, Paola, 2008. "Investing for the old age : pensions, children and savings," Social Protection Discussion Papers 47101, The World Bank.
  5. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Pensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(12), pages 2303-2321, December.
  6. Robert Fenge & Volker Meier, 2009. "Are family allowances and fertility-related pensions perfect substitutes?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 137-163, April.

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