Efficient risk-sharing under adverse selection and subjective risk perception
AbstractThe present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an adverse selection insurance economy. We start from a natural extension of the classical model, assumer less than perfect risk perceptions. We propose first and second welfare theorems, by means of which we describe efficiency-enhancing policies. Notions of weak and strong adverse selection are promising for interpreting real world insurance arrangements.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 2002-19.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mouhamadou Fall, 2012. "Fiabilité des tests génétiques et architecture des contrats d'équilibre," Working Papers halshs-00751861, HAL.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
- Ciprian Matis & Eugenia Matis, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 17.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.