Why Executive Power Centralizes Government
AbstractThis paper examines the effects of political parties, executive power and efficiency on federal structure. It proposes and tests a model of federalism in which different levels of veto power can lead to varying degrees of centralization in the provision of central and local governmental services when executive and legislative branches have disparate preferences over which level should provide services. Results for the US (1982-1992) find state and local spending centralizes with increased veto power because, absent offsetting political party advocacy for decentralization, central government spending interests dominate local government spending interests.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 09.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 15 Nov 2004
Date of revision: 20 Jun 2005
Federalism; Centralization; Political parties; Executive power; Veto;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2005-01-02 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-PBE-2005-01-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-01-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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