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A Strategic Market Game of a Finite Economy with a Mutual Bank

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Author Info
Martin Shubik () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Jingang Zhao

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Abstract

We introduce a strategic market game for an exchange economy not having enough commodity money. We show the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium for any finite replication economy with a mutual bank, we then show that efficient trade can be achieved in the limiting economy by expanding the money supply through the use of fractional reserves, where the commodity money is demonetized and used for reserves. The means of exchange becomes bank credit backed in part, by "gold." However, efficiency cannot be achieved in general as a non-cooperative equilibrium of a finite player game or a finite exchange economy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 961.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1990
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Publication status: Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (1991), 22: 257-274
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:961

Note: CFP 807.
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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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