This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Use of Simple Games to Illustrate Concepts and to Provide Experimental Evidence

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Martin Shubik () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper is devoted to a discussion of several simple experimental games used in a series of lectures on game theory. The prime purpose of these games was to raise questions and illustrate problems in the construction of game theoretical models in the social sciences. The students were asked to make choices or to give opinions as to what imputation should be recommended as a solution in a cooperative game.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d07a/d0744.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 744.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: May 1985
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:744

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Glena Ames).

Related research
Keywords: Game theory; cooperative game solutions; strategic form; extensive form;

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.

This page was last updated on 2010-1-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.