The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores of an Economy
AbstractThree variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1439.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2003
Date of revision:
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
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- Chen-Zhong Qin & Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 2009. "Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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