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Why Does Capital Flow From Poor To Rich Countries? Interest Groups And Dynamic Games In Poor Countries

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Tornell, Aaron
Velasco, Andres

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9393/RR90-39.pdf
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 90-39.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1990
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:90-39

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Keywords: conflicts ; stocks ; economic equilibrium ; capital depreciation;

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  1. Van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1985. "Trade reform, aggregate investment and capital flight : On credibility and the value of information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 369-372. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 92-96, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "External debt, capital flight and political risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3-4), pages 199-220, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Dani Rodrik, 1989. "Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 2999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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