IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cvh/coecwp/2019-09.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Upstream responsibility games – the non-tree case

Author

Listed:
  • Pintér, Miklós
  • Radványi, Anna Ráhel

Abstract

In this paper the problem of sharing the cost of emission in supply chains is considered. (Gopalakrishnan et al, 2017) focus on allocation problems that can be described by rooted trees, called cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called upstream responsibility games. This paper generalizes the formal notion of upstream responsibility games to a non-tree model, and provides two (primal and dual) characterizations of the class of these games. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value under both characterizations are also provided. This is a followup paper of Radványi (2018); Pintér and Radványi (2019).

Suggested Citation

  • Pintér, Miklós & Radványi, Anna Ráhel, 2019. "Upstream responsibility games – the non-tree case," Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) 2019/09, Corvinus University of Budapest.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2019/09
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/4325/
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    upstream responsibility games; cost sharing; emission; supply chain; shapley value; axiomatization of the shapley value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2019/09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Adam Hoffmann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bkeeehu.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.