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Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée

Author

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  • Sandrine OLLIER

    (Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Economiques, Université de Franche-Comté et GATE, Université Lyon 2)

Abstract

La loi limite la responsabilité des salariés même lorsque ces derniers disposent de suffisamment de fonds propres pour supporter une punition de la part de leur employeur en cas de sinistre grevant la production. Un modèle d'agence généralisée est analysé afin de montrer que ce type de législation, bien que censé accroître le bien-être de tous les salariés, peut nuire aux individus les plus productifs. Imposer une contrainte de responsabilité limitée sur les niveaux de rémunération peut entraîner un effet pervers lorsque les agents les plus productifs, en participant au financement d'un fond couvrant la responsabilité limitée de tous, subventionnent ainsi les agents les moins productifs.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandrine OLLIER, 2006. "Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006033, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2006033
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2006033.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymétrie d’information; agence généralisée; responsabilité limitée;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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