Caballero-Sanz, Francisco (University of Valncia; Commission of the European Communities, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) Moner-Colonques, Rafael (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE); University of Valncia) Sempere-Monerris, JosŽ J. (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES); UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
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The purpose of or paper is to study licensing policies for the owner of a product innovation in a spatial model. We compare patent holderÕs profits when fees are used to extract licenseesÕ rents both in the cases of noncompetitive ( the licence includes en exclusive territory clause) and competitive ( Hotelling competition) oligopoly. Not surprisingly the licensor prefers the inclusion of the exclusive territory clause. Fees are superior to royalties both from the private and social point of view. Social planner intervention is considered in two ways : either there is a centralized technology purchasing decision or a public body develops the technology. It also chooses whether to include or not the restrictive clause . The policy that maximizes the social welfare function is the social planner developing the technology and the noninclusion of exclusive territories.
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