A Note on The Pareto Efficiency of General Oligopolistic Equilibria
AbstractThis note shows that a general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE), a notionrecently introduced in the literature by Neary, may be Pareto-efficient. Consequently,at a GOLE, the allocation of resources can be identical to thatof a competitive equilibrium. We also propose a characterization of Paretoefficientgeneral oligopolistic equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2005-05.
Date of creation: 2005
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