Relative Performance Evaluation, Risk Aversion and Entry
AbstractWe study the relations between compensation schemes and risk aversion of managers in a strategic framework. We first show that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts reduces the equilibrium profits of Cournot firms if managers are not too risk averse. Second, we introduce entry issues in our model. We then show that forbidding RPE can favour competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg in its series LSF Research Working Paper Series with number 07-07.
Date of creation: 2007
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Executive Compensation; Relative Performance Evaluation; Moral Hazard; Market Structure.;
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