Strategically Stable Equilibria in Games with Infinitely Many Pure Strategies

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Strategically Stable Equilibria in Games with Infinitely Many Pure Strategies

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Nabil Al-Najjar (Université du Québec à Montréal)

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Paper provided by Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques in its series Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM with number 9212.

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Date of creation: Aug 1992
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Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9212

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