Shareholders are attributed a residual right to use information on corporate prospects, which is produced within the firm. The firm allocates these rights to the highest bidder on behalf of shareholders. It is argued that this allocation is the natural benchmark for assessing the impact of insider trading on asset market equilibrium and for deriving policy implications.
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Paper provided by European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG in its series CEPR Financial Markets Paper with number
0025.