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European Policy Coordination: An Evaluation

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  • Oudiz, Gilles
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    Abstract

    Uncoordinated macroeconomic policies lead to 'beggar thy neighbour' strategies which are clearly suboptimal for the European Community as a whole. Given the high degree of interdependence of their economies, European governments have a clear incentive to export their inflation or their unemployment. No formal model is needed to conclude that among countries which have similar economic structures, policy objectives and policy instruments such competition is bound to be futile and costly for all concerned. In this paper we try to shed light on these aspects of European policy coordination, both through the use of a simple analytic model and through an empirical evaluation of the potential gains of superior European strategies.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 81.

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    Date of creation: Oct 1985
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    Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:81

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    Related research

    Keywords: Beggar-thy-Neighbour Policies; Europe; Macroeconomic Policy Coordination;

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    Cited by:
    1. Carrera, Jorge Eduardo, 1995. "Efectos precio y comercio en un area monetaria asimetrica
      [Price and trade effects in an asymmetric monetary area]
      ," MPRA Paper 7844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Peter Mooslechner & Martin Schuerz, 1999. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: Any Lessons for EMU? A Selective Survey of the Literature," Empirica, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 171-199, September.
    3. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Macroeconomic policy effects in a monetary union," Working Papers 1993-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    4. Scheide, Joachim & Sinn, Stefan, 1987. "Internationale Koordination der Wirtschaftspolitik: Pro und Contra," Kiel Discussion Papers 135, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).

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