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Which Rules Rather than Discretion in a Democracy? An Axiomatic Approach

Author

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  • Cohen, Daniel
  • Michel, Philippe

Abstract

This paper sets a framework for analysing how memoryless voters may come to elect and re-elect a committed policy-maker. Policy-makers, we assume, are trusted to implement the policy that they announce ex ante (and do implement it, if elected and re-elected). Voters, however, are never bound by their previous votes. With no restrictions imposed on the ex ante announcements of the policy-makers, no commitment is, in general, feasible. (As we argue in the text, the Barro-Gordon framework is an exception.) What we show in the paper is how a (natural) set of axiomatic restrictions imposed on the set of policy announcements may yield an unambiguous stationary state towards which all policy announcements will converge.

Suggested Citation

  • Cohen, Daniel & Michel, Philippe, 1991. "Which Rules Rather than Discretion in a Democracy? An Axiomatic Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 537, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:537
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