IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/4378.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Trust and Trustworthiness Among Europeans: South-North Comparison

Author

Listed:
  • Ichino, Andrea
  • Schlag, Karl
  • Bornhorst, Fabian
  • Winter, Eyal

Abstract

This Paper discovers significant differences between southern and northern Europeans in a dynamic version of the ?trust game? played by Ph.D. students from different nationalities at the European University Institute. Our version of the trust game allows subjects to choose the receivers to whom they make transfers. Southerners are discriminated against, particularly in terms of contacts and mainly by northern subjects. Strikingly, this discrimination builds up rather than dying out with experience. More than for not being trustworthy (i.e. having a low propensity to reciprocate by making a generous payback for a transfer received), Southerners are being punished for their own low level of trust (i.e. having a low propensity to contact another player with a generous transfer), and for this reason end up leaving the game with lower pay-offs.

Suggested Citation

  • Ichino, Andrea & Schlag, Karl & Bornhorst, Fabian & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Trust and Trustworthiness Among Europeans: South-North Comparison," CEPR Discussion Papers 4378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4378
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP4378
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trust; Trustworthiness; European regions; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4378. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.