Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much?
AbstractThis Paper uses an unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data has two striking features: not all firms report they need to pay bribes; and there is considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar institutions/policies. To explain these patterns we construct a simple bargaining model. The model yields predictions on both the incidence and the level of graft. Consistent with the model we find that variation in policies/regulations (across industries) explain the incidence of corruption, while variation in profitability and technology choice explain the variation in bribes for the group of bribe paying firms. These findings suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are endogenously determined in order to extract bribes.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3167.
Date of creation: Jan 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - General
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2003-03-14 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2003-03-14 (Microeconomics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- World Bank, 2008. "Mauritania : Anti-Corruption Study," World Bank Other Operational Studies 12731, The World Bank.
- Indranil Dutta & Ajit Mishra, 2004.
"Corruption and Competition in the Presence of Inequality and Market Imperfections,"
123, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Indranil Dutta & Ajit Mishra, 2003. "Corruption and Competition in the Presence of Inequality and Market Imperfections," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 152, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.