Imperfect Competition, Underemployment Equilibria and Fiscal Policy
Abstract
It is often claimed that the demand externality created by imperfectly competitive markets can provide an analytical basis for Keynesian fiscal policy prescriptions. Here this demand externality is embedded in a model where saving and employment are determined by optimizing choices in an imperfectly competitive setting. It turns out that underemployment equilibria do exist, that there is scope for fiscal intervention, but that Keynesian fiscal prescriptions are turned on their head. Demand externalities among imperfectly competitive firms do not in general provide a theoretical basis for these prescriptions, unless supplemented by other deviations from the Walrasian standard in the labor or capital market.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 280.Length:
Date of creation: May 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:280
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Related research
Keywords: Employment; Externalities; Fiscal Policy; Imperfect Competition; Underemployment;Other versions of this item:
- Pagano, Marco, 1990. "Imperfect Competition, Underemployment Equilibria and Fiscal Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 440-63, June.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
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EPRU Working Paper Series
94-07, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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