Insider Trading, Investment and Liquidity
AbstractWe compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately informed 'monopolistic' insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim information revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detail.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2251.
Date of creation: Oct 1999
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Repullo, R., 1994.
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9425, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
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- Boot, Arnoud W A & Gopalan, Radhakrishnan & Thakor, Anjan, 2006. "Market Liquidity, Investor Participation and Managerial Autonomy: Why Do Firms Go Private?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrea M. Buffa & Giovanna Nicodano, 2008.
"Should Insider Trading be Prohibited when Share Repurchases are Allowed?,"
Review of Finance,
European Finance Association, vol. 12(4), pages 735-765.
- Andrea Buffa & Giovanna Nicodano, 2006. "Should Insider Trading be Prohibited when Share Repurchases are Allowed?," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 16, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
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