Flexible Integration as an Efficient Decision-Making Rule
AbstractIn this paper we combine a non-cooperative decision-making game in a federal structure with two levels of interest and an incomplete contract which sets the rules of the game. The question we pose is how to combine ex ante efficiency of the design with ex post efficiency of the outcomes in the decision-making game. The paper shows that in common policies there are no designs that lead to both types of efficiency but flexible integration is a way to achieve both.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2207.
Date of creation: Aug 1999
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Casella, A., 2000.
"Games for Central Bankers, Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions,"
00a02, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Casella, Alessandra, 2000. "Games for Central Bankers: Markets vs. Politics in Public Policy Decisions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2496, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandra Casella, 2000. "Games for Central Bankers: Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions," NBER Working Papers 8026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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