Hostile Stakes and the Role of Banks in German Corporate Governance
AbstractThis paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patterns. The paper also suggests an important role for banks in helping predators accumulate, and avoid the disclosure of, large stakes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1695.
Date of creation: Oct 1997
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- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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- Heiss, Florian & Köke, Jens, 2001.
"Dynamics in ownership and firm survival: evidence from corporate Germany,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
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- Jens Köke, 2002. "Dynamics in ownership and ﬁrm survival: Evidence from corporate Germany," MEA discussion paper series 02013, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
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