Optimal Determination of Bookmakers' Betting Odds: Theory and Tests
AbstractThis paper develops a theoretical model of how bookmakers’ odds are determined, given varying levels of inside information on the part of punters. Bookmakers’ attitudes towards risk and the degree of competition between them will influence bookmaker behaviour. Using a data set of 1696 races in Ireland in 1993, we find that bookmakers are extremely risk-averse, and estimate that operating costs and monopoly rents combined account for up to 4% of turnover and that between 3.1% and 3.7% of betting is by punters with inside information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1623.
Date of creation: Apr 1997
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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