Inflation and financing of public expenditure by are analysed in an OLG model where the deficit is constrained to be less than a given fraction of intergenerational savings. Even if there may be multiplicity of steady-state equilibria, we show that, with such a constraint, the dynamics with adaptive learning are globally convergent to a set of equilibria satisfying a local stability condition. We allow for heterogeneity of agents' learning rules and look at the role of some basic behavioural assumptions, such as a certain degree of random e-precautionary savings and inertia on agents' updating of beliefs. We also provide experimental evidence on the effect of public expenditure constraints on the stability of equilibria.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
1310.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
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