In the aftermath of the international debt crisis of the 1980s reciprocal trade arrangements experienced a resurgence. This paper examines how countertrade can help highly indebted countries to finance imports if they are not able to use standard credit arrangements. It compares the credit enforcement mechanisms discussed by the sovereign debt literature with those available under countertrade agreements and shows under what conditions countertrade can increase the debt capacity of highly indebted countries. The implications of our model for the design of optimal countertrade contracts are consistent with empirical evidence from a data set of 230 countertrade transactions.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
1185.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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