Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?
AbstractWe investigate the nature of monitoring by stake holders using data on Japanese manufacturing firms. Shareholders and bank-centred corporate groups monitor firms by reducing activities with scope for managerial moral hazard such as advertising, R&D and entertainment expenses. Monitoring of this type takes place even when the monitored firm is not in financial distress. Although in Japan it is difficult to distinguish empirically between monitoring motivated by debt and monitoring motivated by equity stake, the data indicate that shareholders monitor firms continuously, while debt holders may intervene when firm performance is poor.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1178.
Date of creation: May 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Akihiko Kawaura, 2004. "Deregulation and governance: plight of Japanese banks in the 1990s," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(5), pages 479-484.
- Gorton, Gary & Kahl, Matthias, 2001. "The Scarcity of Effective Monitors and Its Implications For Corporate Takeovers and Ownership Structures," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt2tj5w4mt, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
- Gary Gorton & Matthias Kahl, 2002. "The Scarcity of Effective Monitors and Its Implications For Corporate Takeovers and Ownership Structures," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-30, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- V. Cerasi & S. Daltung, 1995.
"The Optimal Size of a Bank: Costs and Benefits of Diversification,"
Departmental Working Papers
1995-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2000. "The optimal size of a bank: Costs and benefits of diversification," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1701-1726, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.