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Implementation of plans or contracts and equilibria with rationing . part i

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  • Younes Yves

Abstract

This paper analyses the basic features of technical and distributional changes in the US since the Civil War as the expression of the gradual emergence of a new paradigm, corresponding to a Managerial Revolution, and its replacement of the earlier organization inherited from the Industrial Revolution.

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  • Younes Yves, 1984. "Implementation of plans or contracts and equilibria with rationing . part i," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8405, CEPREMAP.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8405
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grandmont, Jean-Michel & Laroque, Guy & Younes, Yves, 1978. "Equilibrium with quantity rationing and recontracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 84-102, October.
    2. Diamond, P. A., 1975. "A many-person Ramsey tax rule," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-342, November.
    3. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
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