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A value on 'AN

Author

Listed:
  • MERTENS, Jean-François
  • NEYMAN, Abraham

Abstract

We prove here the existence of a value (of norm 1) on the spaces 'NA and even 'AN, the closure in the variation distance of the linear space spanned by all games f o \mu, where \mu is a non-atomic, non-negative finitely additive measure of mass 1 and f a real-valued function on [0, 1] which satisfies a much weakened continuity at zero and one.
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Suggested Citation

  • MERTENS, Jean-François & NEYMAN, Abraham, 2003. "A value on 'AN," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1739, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1739
    Note: In : International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 109-120, 2003.
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    Cited by:

    1. Neyman, Abraham, 2010. "Singular games in bv'NA," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 384-387, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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