We study a particular class of cost sharing games Ð "data games" Ð covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and have a nonempty core. We characterize the core and compute thecompensation scheme derived from the Shapley value. We then compare it to the nucleolus.Although we use the term "data" our analysis actually applies to any good characterized bynon rivalry and excludability.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
2007094.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Value Theory M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting