Competitive spatial price discrimination with capacity constraints
AbstractA model of duopolistic spatial price discrimination on a network is extended by adding capacity constraints on firms'outputs. With zero-one consumer demands, some configurations of capacity levels and locations do not have pure strategy Nash equilibria in price schedules, in particular when firms have some excess capacity but not enough to serve the entire market individually. An alternative to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in price schedules - the core of the market game among producers and consumers - is described and shown to have allocations corresponding to pure strategies for all location and capacity configurations. If both firms have some excess capacity, price schedules are identical to those in the uncapacitated problem. Equilibrium prices are no higher than the lowest prices in the mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1992031.
Date of creation: 01 May 1992
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Other versions of this item:
- HAMILTON, Jonathan H., . "Competitive Spatial Price Discrimination with Capacity Constraints," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hamilton, J.H & Thisse, J-F., 1990. "Competitive Spacial Price Discrimination With Capacity Constraints," Papers 90-3, Florida - College of Business Administration.
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
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