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Colusión en los procesos de licitación de proyectos de construcción vial y soluciones

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  • Miguel de Quinto Arredonda

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Abstract

Este documento tiene como propósito diseñar un mecanismo que permita explicar los esquemas colusorios que potencialmente pueden presentarse en una licitación para proyectos de obras en Colombia. Para el efecto, se toma una licitación estándar en Colombia en temas de concesión vial y siguiendo la propuesta metodológica de Harsanyi (1963), se utilizan funciones de mejor respuesta para que los entes coludidos definan sus estrategias cuando la propuesta de un tercer agente no coludido sea perfectamente previsible. También se estudia la estrategia de este cartel cuando se presentan más de tres licitantes. Al final, se enumeran algunas recomendaciones para reducir la formación de carteles en licitaciones.

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File URL: http://www.sic.gov.co/drupal/recursos_user/documentos/Estudios-Academicos/Estudios-Academicos_2012/04_Colusion_Procesos_Licitacion_Proyectos_Construccion_Vial_Soluciones.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by SUPERINTENDENCIA DE INDUSTRIA Y COMERCIO in its series ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS SIC with number 010489.

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Length: 27
Date of creation: 28 Oct 2012
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Handle: RePEc:col:000458:010489

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Related research

Keywords: colusión; licitación pública; carteles; construcción; concesiones;

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