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Las decisiones colectivas en el caso de la titulación de activos

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Author Info
Roberto Fortich ()

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Abstract

La literatura sobre desarrollo económico y pobreza de los últimos años ha enfatizado en el tema de los derechos de propiedad, las instituciones informales y su relación con el mercado de capitales. Este trabajo busca modelar algunos aspectos de la obra del economista Hernando De Soto en el tema de la informalidad, específicamente¿cómo es que el establecimiento de un sistema de propiedad permite a la gente elegir de entre un conjunto mayor de socios comerciales?, y ¿por qué la decisión individual costo-beneficio de expedir un título legal de propiedad es considerada un asunto de redes? Para modelar este problema, se utilizó un enfoque de teoría de juegos: los pagos están relacionados con la distribución de la población total entre sectores formales e informales, y surgen fenómenos de retroalimentación positiva y externalidades. Las conclusiones incluyen análisis de política para el caso de la vivienda en Colombia. **************************************************************************************************************** Recent literature on economic development and poverty has stressed the issue of property rights, informal institutions and their relationship with capital markets. This paper intends to model some aspects of economist Hernando De Soto’s work on informality, particularly ¿how does the establishment of a property system allows people to choose from a larger set of trading partners?, and ¿why is the individual cost-benefit decision of getting a legal property title considered a network issue?. A game theory approach was followed to model this problem: payoffs are correlated with the distribution of total population between official and unofficial sectors, and issues of positive feedback and externalities arise. Conclusions include some policy analysis for the case of housing in Colombia.

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Paper provided by UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA in its series BORRADORES DE INVESTIGACIÓN with number 004359.

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Length: 26
Date of creation: 31 Aug 2006
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Handle: RePEc:col:000091:004359

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