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Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model

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Author Info
Miguel Amaral (ATOM – U. of Paris I Sorbonne)
Stéphane Saussier (ADIS – U. of Paris 11 & ATOM – U. of Paris I Sorbonne)
Anne Yvrande-Billon () (ATOM – U. of Paris I Sorbonne)

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate the relationship between auctions’ results and the number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London. Using an original database concerning 294 local transportation routes we find that a higher number of bidders is associated with a lower cost of service. This finding, in addition of being one of the first empirical test of a crucial and understudied theoretical issue has important policy implications, especially for countries in which bids are organized such that only few bidders are allowed to answer (e.g. France).

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File URL: http://www.cni.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/documents/RePEc/cni/working_paper/yvrande-billon_2006_does-competition-for-the-field-improve-cost-efficiency-cni_wp_no_2006-14.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI) in its series Working Papers with number 2006-14.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 13 Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cni:wpaper:2006-14

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Related research
Keywords: public services; transportation; franchise bidding; public-private partnerships; winner’s curse; auctions;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H0 - Public Economics - - General
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cantillon, Estelle & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6083, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1991. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 362-69, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Kennedy, David, 1995. "London Bus Tendering: The Impact on Costs," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 305-17.
  5. Hong, Han & Shum, Matthew, 2002. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(4), pages 871-98, October.
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  6. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
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  7. Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions," Microeconomics 0511011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

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