Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model
AbstractIn this paper we investigate the relationship between auctions’ results and the number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London. Using an original database concerning 294 local transportation routes we find that a higher number of bidders is associated with a lower cost of service. This finding, in addition of being one of the first empirical test of a crucial and understudied theoretical issue has important policy implications, especially for countries in which bids are organized such that only few bidders are allowed to answer (e.g. France).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI) in its series Working Papers with number 2006-14.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 13 Sep 2006
Date of revision:
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public services; transportation; franchise bidding; public-private partnerships; winner’s curse; auctions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-01-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2007-01-14 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2007-01-14 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2007-01-14 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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- Julie Brux & Claudine Desrieux, 2014. "To allot or not to allot public services? An incomplete contract approach," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 455-476, June.
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