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Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rational for Restrictive Amendment Procedures

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Gilligan, Thomas W.
Krehbiel, Keith.
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File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp632c.pdf
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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 632.

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Date of creation: Mar 1987
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Publication status: Published: Published in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 3 #2 (Fall, 1987):287-334
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:632

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  1. Keith Krehbiel, 2004. "Legislative Organization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 113-128, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Robert A.J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2001. "Producing and Manipulating Information: Private Information Providers versus Public Information Providers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-052/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2004. "Veto-Based Delegation," Discussion Papers 129, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
  5. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2005. "Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment," Microeconomics 0504006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1995. "Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization," Discussion Papers 1134, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Oliver Board & Tiberiu Dragu, 2006. "Expert Advice with Multiple Decision Makers," Working Papers 242, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  8. Iaryczower, Matias, 2007. "Strategic voting in sequential committees," Working Papers 1275, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2001. "Transactions Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," ICER Working Papers 04-2002, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Klaas J. Beniers & Otto H. Swank, 2003. "On the Composition of Committees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-006/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2002. "The Congressional Budget Process and the Aggregate Level of Spending," Working papers 2002-13, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Bargaining," Discussion Papers 1089, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  15. Felix J. J. Vardy & John Morgan, 2007. "On the Buyability of Voting Bodies," IMF Working Papers 07/165, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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