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• Jeffrey Scot Banks

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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 524.

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Date of creation: Apr 1984
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Publication status: Published: Published in Social Choice and Welfare 1985, Vol. 1, p. 295-306
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:524

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