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Finite perfect information extensive games with generic payoffs

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Author Info
Hummel, Patrick
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File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1235.pdf
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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1235.

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Length: 4 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2005
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Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1235

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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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Related research
Keywords: perfect information games; extensive games; backward induction; Weakly dominated strategies; iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies; generic payoffs;

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  1. Hummel, Patrick, 2005. "Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting," Working Papers 1236, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gretlein, Rodney, J, 1982. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 527-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Hummel, Patrick, 2005. "Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting," Working Papers 1236, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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