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A bargaining model of legislative policy-making

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Author Info
Banks, Jeffrey S.
Duggan, John

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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1162.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: May 2003
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Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1162

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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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Related research
Keywords: bargaining; legislatures; status quo; median voter;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. " The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-54, June.
  2. Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
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  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Schofield, Norman, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1985. "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1151-72, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eraslan, Hulya, 2002. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 1998. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Working Papers 1036, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 195-200, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 893-907, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Donald G. Saari, 1997. "The generic existence of a core for q -rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 219-260.
  12. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Hülya K. K. Eraslan, 2008. "Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates From A Bargaining Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 659-681, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Eraslan, H. & Merlo, A., 2000. "Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining," Working Papers 00-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 118-130, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  18. McKelvey, Richard D & Schofield, Norman, 1987. "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 923-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. " The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 1-20, January.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Krehbiel, Keith & Meirowitz, Adam & Woon, Jonathan, 2004. "Testing Theories of Lawmaking," Research Papers 1860, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Majority Rule Dynamics with Endogenous Status Quo," Wallis Working Papers WP46, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2003. "A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games," Working Papers 1163, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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