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A bargaining model of legislative policy-making Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Banks, Jeffrey S.
Duggan, John
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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number
1162.
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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: May 2003Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1162Contact details of provider: Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125 Phone: 626 395-4065 Fax: 626 405-9841 Email: Web page: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ss
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Keywords: bargaining ; legislatures ; status quo ; median voter ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990.
" The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval ,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty ,
Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-54, June.
Merlo, Antonio, 1997.
"Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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Other versions:
Merlo, Antonio, 1996.
"Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment ,"
Bulletins
7476, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
[Downloadable!] Merlo, A., 1992.
"Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment ,"
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92-55, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!] Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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Schofield, Norman, 1983.
"Generic Instability of Majority Rule ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1985.
"A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1151-72, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eraslan, Hulya, 2002.
"Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995.
"Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536.
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Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 1998.
"Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game ,"
Working Papers
1036, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989.
"The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 195-200, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002.
"Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 893-907, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Donald G. Saari, 1997.
"The generic existence of a core for q -rules (*) ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 219-260.
Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995.
"A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hülya K. K. Eraslan, 2008.
"Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates From A Bargaining Model ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 659-681, 05.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eraslan, H. & Merlo, A., 2000.
"Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining ,"
Working Papers
00-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993.
"The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2003.
"Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 118-130, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999.
"A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice ,"
Working Papers
1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
McKelvey, Richard D & Schofield, Norman, 1987.
"Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 923-33, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990.
" The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 1-20, January.
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Krehbiel, Keith & Meirowitz, Adam & Woon, Jonathan, 2004.
"Testing Theories of Lawmaking ,"
Research Papers
1860, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007.
"Majority Rule Dynamics with Endogenous Status Quo ,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP46, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
[Downloadable!]
John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007.
"Dynamic Legislative Policy Making ,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
[Downloadable!]
Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2003.
"A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games ,"
Working Papers
1163, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
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