We consider discontinuous games with incomplete information. Auctions are a leading example. With standard tie breaking rules (or more generally, sharing rules), these games may not have equilibria. We consider sharing rules that depend on the private information of players. We show that there exists an equilibrium of an augmented game with an incentive compatible sharing rule in which players reveal their private information for the purpose of determining sharing. We also show that for a large class of private value auctions, ties never occur in the equilibrium of the augmented game. This establishes existence of equilibria in such auctions with standard tie breaking rules.
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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number
1075.
Length: 54 pages Date of creation: Nov 1999 Date of revision: Publication status: Published: Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1075
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Matthew O. Jackson & James Peck, 1993.
"Costly Information Acquisition,"
Discussion Papers
1087, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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