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Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games (joint with Dilip Abreu)

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David Pearce
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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/iobara/seminar/Bargainingandeq'mselection.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Theory workshop papers with number 357966000000000094.

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Date of creation: 23 May 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000094

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