Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Dynamiques d’arbitrage entre écotaxe et permis d’émissions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Arnaud Dragicevic
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper proposes three analyses of the tradeoff mechanism between ecotax and carbon credit. Our wish is to compare the ecotax level with the carbon credit price, subject to the minimization of the cost inherent to emissions. We redefine the calculus equations of the firm profit, in which we inject the parameters of energy intensity and emission intensity. We proceed to one static and two dynamic studies, whither we adapt the methodology of population dynamics. Our results highlight a simple tradeoff rule between ecotax and carbon credit, both in the static and dynamic models. In uncertainty, the rule determines whether the level of environmental tax is under- or overvalued compared to the carbon credit price. As well, the study enables to determine the global level of tax revenue attainable by the enforcement of the environmental taxation. Ce papier propose trois analyses sur le mécanisme d’arbitrage entre écotaxes et permis d’émissions. Notre souhait est de comparer le niveau de l’écotaxe avec le prix du permis d’émissions, sous contrainte de minimisation du coût inhérent aux émissions. Nous redéfinissons les équations de calcul du profit des entreprises où nous injectons les paramètres d’intensité énergétique et de facteur d’émissions. Nous procédons à une étude statique puis à deux études dynamiques dans lesquelles nous adaptons la méthodologie de la dynamique des populations. Nos résultats mettent en exergue une simple règle d’arbitrage entre écotaxe et permis d’émissions, aussi bien dans le modèle statique que les modèles dynamiques. Dans l’incertitude, la règle détermine si le niveau de la taxe environnementale est sous- ou surévalué par rapport au prix du permis d’émissions. L’étude permet également de déterminer le niveau global des recettes fiscales atteignable par la mise en vigueur de l’éco-fiscalité.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2011s-45.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2011s-45.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 01 May 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-45

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 2020 rue University, 25e étage, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2A5
    Phone: (514) 985-4000
    Fax: (514) 985-4039
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: diseconomic profit; environmental taxation; emissions trading; evolutionary game theory.; profit déséconomique; éco-fiscalité; bourse du carbone; théorie des jeux évolutionnaires.;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.