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Partage des coûts et tarification des infrastructures : Enjeux, problématique et pertinence

Author

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Michel Moreaux
  • Michel Truchon

Abstract

Most, if not all, organizations allocate common costs in one way or another among their various components or among their various partners. These common cost sharing problems are becoming increasingly acute as common cost sharing rules are important factors in competitiveness and performance. Although their explicit scientific analysis is already relatively advanced, their application within organizations (companies, alliances or business networks, governments) remains relatively embryonic and often dependent on an ad hoc historical approach, rather than rationally chosen to maximize organizational performance and value. We believe that organizations, broadly defined, would benefit from investing resources in learning common cost sharing methods that are more rigorous, efficient, equitable and incentive-based than those commonly used. We stress the importance of this investment in an economic context where the development of common infrastructures, both private and public, is omnipresent and conditions efficiency gains, which themselves have become the real cornerstone of competitiveness. We briefly present some cost sharing methods (Shapley-Shubik, nucleoli, sequential rule, ECPR, Ramsey-Boiteux, GPC). The study of these methods, which could better enhance the value of common infrastructures, is pursued in greater depth in the other documents in this series. Finally, we show how these methods have been or could be applied to nine problems that represent a much broader set of possible applications. La plupart des organisations, sinon toutes, répartissent d'une manière ou d'une autre des coûts communs entre leurs diverses composantes ou encore entre leurs différents partenaires. Ces problèmes de partage de coûts communs se posent avec de plus en plus d'acuité car les règles de partage des coûts communs sont des facteurs importants de compétitivité et de performance. Bien que leur analyse scientifique explicite soit déjà relativement avancée, leur application au sein des organisations (entreprises, alliances ou réseaux d entreprises, gouver-nements) reste relativement embryonnaire et souvent tributaire d'une approche historique ad hoc, plutôt que rationnellement choisie pour maximiser la performance et la valeur de l'organisation. Nous croyons que les organisations, entendues au sens large, auraient intérêt à investir des ressources dans l'apprentissage de méthodes de partage de coûts communs plus rigoureuses, plus efficaces, plus équitables et plus incitatives que celles couramment utilisées. Nous insistons sur l'importance de cet investissement dans un contexte économique où le développement d'infrastructures communes, tant privées que publiques, est omniprésent et conditionne les gains d efficacité, devenus eux-mêmes la véritable pierre angulaire de la com-pétitivité. Nous présentons brièvement certaines méthodes de partage de coûts (Shapley-Shubik, nucléole, règle séquentielle, ECPR, Ramsey-Boiteux, GPC). L'étude de ces méthodes, susceptibles de mieux valoriser les infrastructures communes, est poursuivie plus en profondeur dans les autres documents de la présente série. Nous montrons enfin comment ces méthodes ont été ou pourraient être appliquées à neuf problèmes représentatifs d'un ensemble beaucoup plus vaste d'applications possibles.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux & Michel Truchon, 2002. "Partage des coûts et tarification des infrastructures : Enjeux, problématique et pertinence," CIRANO Burgundy Reports 2002rb-03, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirbur:2002rb-03
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2002RB-03.pdf
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