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Robustness in Contracts: Inferring Strategies from Past Play

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  • Tridib Sharma

    (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM))

Abstract

It is generally understood that in situations of asymmetric information, the principal is better off committing to long term contracts than committing to short term contracts. The result holds true even when long term contracts are constrained to be renegotiation proof. The paper argues that the longrun renegotiation proof contracts, which the literature uses as benchmarks for comparison, are not robust to the possibility of certain kinds of renegotiation. The renegotiations that we have in mind are those which (potentially)take place after the principal comprehends previous strategies of the agent by using behavioral or statistical techniques. We show that for 'high' discount factors the principal is not strictly better off by committing to longrun contracts that are robust to renegotiations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number 9803.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:9803

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