Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Loyalty and competence: Empirical evidence from public agencies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alexander F. Wagner

    (University of Zurich and swiss Finance Institute)

Abstract

Recent organizational theories suggest that there is a tradeoff between loyalty and competence. This paper tests several such theories in the context of public agencies. Prime ministers, chancellors, and kings alike need to secure the (efficient or inefficient) loyalty of their agencies, such as support in important policy proposals or low corruption. They are also interested in agencies’ levels of competence. I find that governments have highly competent officials in their agencies (1) where officials have few private sector contacts, (2) where officials can extract few bribes, (3) where careers in agencies are expected to be long-lasting, and (4) where the agencies are powerful, i.e., where their loyalty is important. This set of findings fits best with a theory of loyalty as a noncontractible behavior, implying that too competent staff cannot be induced to loyalty unless loyalty is highly valued by the government. Other theories are either rejected or are less plausible because they cannot explain the complete set of observed regularities.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948635
File Function: First version, 1996
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Swiss Finance Institute in its series Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series with number 06-34.

as in new window
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision: Oct 2006
Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp0634

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.SwissFinanceInstitute.ch
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Loyalty; self-enforcing contracts; public agencies; corporate finance;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp0634. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marilyn Barja).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.