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Politicians’ Social Welfare Criteria – An Experiment with German Legislators

Author

Listed:
  • Sandro Ambuehl
  • Sebastian Blesse
  • Philipp Doerrenberg
  • Christoph Feldhaus
  • Axel Ockenfels

Abstract

Much economic analysis derives policy recommendations based on social welfare criteria intended to model the preferences of a policy maker. Yet, little is known about policy maker's normative views in a way amenable to this use. In a behavioral experiment, we elicit German legislators' social welfare criteria unconfounded by political economy constraints. When resolving preference conflicts across individuals, politicians place substantially more importance on least-favored than on most-favored alternatives, contrasting with both common aggregation mechanisms and the equal weighting inherent in utilitarianism and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. When resolving preference conflicts within individuals, we find no support for the commonly used "long-run criterion" which insists that choices merit intervention only if the lure of immediacy may bias intertemporal choice. Politicians' and the public's social welfare criteria largely coincide.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandro Ambuehl & Sebastian Blesse & Philipp Doerrenberg & Christoph Feldhaus & Axel Ockenfels, 2023. "Politicians’ Social Welfare Criteria – An Experiment with German Legislators," ifo Working Paper Series 391, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_391
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    Keywords

    Positive welfare economics; politicians; preference aggregation; paternalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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